

The Origin of US Racial Imperialism

: The White “Civilizing” State against the Red “Savages”

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1. Introduction: The Politics of Identity\Difference in Early Modern America

In his monumental writing, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” Frederick Jackson Turner (1994 [1896], 32) declared that “the true point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic coast, it is the Great West.” My paper agrees with part of the so-called “Turner thesis,” which emphasizes that Westward expansion built a true American character distinguishable from European history. Just as Tzvetan Todorov (1984, 5) states that the conquest of the New World “heralds and establishes our present identity,” so the modern idea of the United States began with its continental colonization. However, I analyze the American frontier not as the seedbed of American democracy but as a “contact point” or an intercommunal¹ sphere where various distinctive actors, such as European empires, aboriginal nations, and Euro-American squatters, (often violently) interacted (Nobles, 1997; Tyrrell, 2007, 75). Although the West has long been a symbol of American exceptionalism, it should be woven into a larger modern global fabric of empires and colonies.

I will argue that processes of imperial encounters generated the anti-elitist, anti-intellectual, and anti-East Coast ethos among the white frontier populations that formed an aspect of American identity: the white “civilizing” state against the red “barbarians.” This American Self, on the basis of borderland experiences, led to the creation of popular imperialism or the Jacksonian tradition against liberal internationalism in the discourse of US grand strategy.

¹ Here, we need to note that the modern Europe-oriented term inter-“national” is inappropriate to describe what happened between empires, English colonies/states, and native tribes in early modern North America. That is, we should consider “the sovereign territorial states that are associated with the Westphalian settlement of 1648 as only one type of polity” in world history so as not to fall into the error of Eurocentrism or presentism (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1997, 22). Xavier Guillaume’s (2011, 2) caution that the conventional conceptualization of “the international” presupposing the territorial state system is too limiting “when one is concerned with either non-Western, postcolonial or pre/postmodern experiences” is crucial in this sense. We might coin such new terms as “inter-communal” (Grovogui, 1996) or “inter-polity” relations to accurately understand our historical context. Even when we habitually use the term “inter-national,” this contextual caveat needs to be noted. See also Kupperman (2002).

This paper concentrates on the politics of identity\difference (Connolly, 2002), i.e. the co-constituting processes of “White Americans” and “Red Indians” at the turn of the nineteenth century. As we will see, Europeans actively mobilized their traditional images of dangerous Others to apprehend and construct a stereotype of “Indians” as a cognitive process of domination. On the other hand, as a “constitutive outside” (Hall, 1996, 4), the “Indian” Other was not only subsumed by the European racist discourse but also actively constituted the American Ego in the West. These reciprocal procedures of identity\difference politics have a significant meaning in analyzing the relationship between the American native inhabitants and European colonists on the Continent. The rise of racist identities (or the divergence of ethnic consciousness), as well as the material imbalance of power between the two groups, fundamentally shaped the trajectory of intercommunal conflicts. That is, whether Europeans viewed Amerindians as either common human beings that could be communicated with on an equal footing, or inferior and dangerous Others that should be exterminated had a major impact on historical relationships between Europeans and Amerindians. Therefore, instead of a simple evaluation of material capability, I will investigate the causal mechanisms between idea/identity and attitude/policy. In particular, I will stress the changes in Europeans’ conception of Indians *and* Amerindian’s perception of Europeans to periodize the history of intercommunal relations in early modern North America.

Concerning the research materials, this paper relies mainly on a revisionist reading of US history. The New Western History movement (along with the frontier-borderlands approach) notes that early modern America should be reread in the context of transnational/inter-imperial relations on the Continent, as opposed to the dominant nationalist narrative that has regarded present US borders as being constant and sacrosanct. The movement particularly emphasizes that the interior of early modern North America was the genuine transnational sphere in which a variety of European empires, Euro-American colonies, and native nations competed and allied in both equal and hierarchical manners. Relations between Europeans and Amerindians are reconsidered not as part of US *domestic* development, but as part of early American *foreign* or *imperialist* policy (Citino, 2004, 202–203). The manner by which racialized American identity

was constructed through encounters with native Others is brought into relief in this alternative narrative.

I will trace the successive stages of American borderlands history and explain how the Lockean diplomatic regime of the “middle ground” (White, 2011) changed into Hobbesian anarchy and then led to the establishment of hierarchical colonialism through the rise of hostile racist identities between Euro-Americans and Native Americans as well as the collapse of a balance of power. The Seven Years’ War, the Revolutionary War, and the War of 1812 in the wider context of a global hegemonic rivalry between Britain and France denote the structural shifts that conditioned intercommunal relations on the Continent (Griffin, 2007, 12). Step by step, Amerindians lost their agency to play one European empire off another, and the interactive construction of hostile racial identity was consolidated. Before moving onto this chronological inquiry, we need to understand European theoretical legacies that provided the various discursive repertoires for Euro-American representations of “Indians” in the first place.

2. European Heritage II: Medieval Christianity and the Enlightenment

White settlers brought a variety of preconceptions stemming from the past European experiences in internal/external Others to their contacts with the aboriginal peoples in the New World. In other words, Euromericans perceived America and its native inhabitants through the lens of their existing social stock of knowledge (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004, 50). This “metaphysics of White Indian-understanding” was usually based on a dichotomy between “us” and “them” (Berkhofer, Jr., 1979, xv; 4). Mainly in terms of the ecclesiastical binary between Christians and infidels, and later of the Enlightenment opposition between the civilized and the barbarian, Euro-Americans constructed the image of Native Americans as a separate and single negative Other that was alien and inferior to themselves. As a result, Westerners came to incorporate Amerindians into the modern world system and placed them at the bottom of the Eurocentric discursive order.

In turn, the recognition of the fundamental differences among peoples of the earth after the “Discovery Era” formed a collective identity of Europeans in contradistinction to the colored

aborigines, “in a way resembling that of a photographic negative” (Mason, 1990, 43). The European people used “counterimages of themselves to describe Indians and the counterimages of Indians to describe themselves,” and such a mirroring strategy could reaffirm “White superiority over the worst fears of their own depravity” (Berkhofer, Jr., 1979, 27). New modern ideas, such as the state of nature, the utilitarian theory of the land appropriation, the stage theory of history, and the standard of civilization, all reflected the imperial encounters in the Western hemisphere or the ideational amalgam of the medieval intellectual heritage and the new intercontinental contacts.

Medieval Christianity

According to Siba Grovogui (1996, 8), European theology in the late middle ages constituted a particular form of discourse that “established hierarchical and exploitative relations between its Christian subjects and the other.” Since the “discovery” of America, the ecclesiastical logic established “the philosophical foundation for the totalizing cultural, political, economic, and legal systems of knowledge” (Grovogui, 1996, 8-9) that justified modern European hegemony over the “Rest.” Such logic assumed that Christians should bring salvation to infidels in the New World “through conversion and subsequent incorporation into the Christian order” (Grovogui, 1996, 21; Williams, Jr., 2012, 183).

In 1302, Pope Boniface VIII already proclaimed that all human beings, including both Christians and non-Christians, could be saved only by the Catholic Church. In his *Unam Sactam*, Boniface VIII also claimed the universal sovereignty of Christendom over the entire world for the sake of human salvation (Grovogui, 1996, 19). In the same vein, Pope Alexander VI, issued two papal bulls, *Inter Caetera* (1493), to declare that Spain and Portugal would divide and occupy the New World and that these two Christian kingdoms should convert “Indians” to Christianity (Grovogui, 1996, 20). Even Bartholomew Las Casas, who championed for a humanitarian treatment of the Amerindians in the 1550-51 theological debate with Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda on the Spanish king’s right to conquer the Native Americans of the New World (“The Valladolid debate”), presupposed “the existence of a single true religion, which ineluctably leads

him to assimilate the Indians to a previous (and hence inferior) phase of the Europeans' evolution" (Todorov, 1984, 191).²

The rise of Protestantism in the sixteenth century did not change the preceding epistemic distinction between the Christian Self and the heathen Other in the New World. Rather, Protestants placed more emphasis on the essential differences between Europeans and Native Americans and tried to segregate their group from that of the aborigines, whereas Catholics stressed the commonness between the two ethnic communities as equal humans and sought to convert the natives to Christianity (Todorov, 1984, 191).³ Especially, the English people were more obsessed with the medieval crusading tradition and its profoundly negative attitude toward pagans. For instance, in *Calvin's Case* (1608), Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice for the Court of the King's Bench, contended that infidels (=permanent enemies) had no rights and that there would be no peaceful coexistence between the Christian and the non-Christian:

[A] perpetual enemy (though there be no wars by fire and sword between them) cannot maintain any action, or get anything within this realm. All infidels are in law *perpetui inimici*, perpetual enemies, (for the law presumes not that they will be converted, that being *remota potentia*, a remote possibility), for between them, as with devils, whose subjects they be, and the Christian, there is perpetual hostility, and can be no peace. (cited in Williams, Jr., 2012, 189).

In the same context, early English colonizers in America usually mobilized the militant rhetoric of Protestantism to justify their dispossession of the natives or "naked slaves of the divell" (Williams, Jr., 2012, 194). The Reverend Robert Gray hired by the Virginia Company preached that the European settlers had a religious duty to take land from "wild beasts" and "brutish savages." He even insisted that it was sinful to leave the earth to keep in "the hands of

² Later, in his old age, Las Casas radically moved to a kind of "multicultural/pluralist" position. He did not privilege the Christian belief over the Native American religion and relativized the meaning of "barbarism" by inferring that "just as we consider the peoples of the Indies barbarians, they judge us to be the same, because they do not understand us" (Todorov, 1984, 190-191).

³ Pope Paul III's 1537 papal bull *Sublimis Deus*, for example, recognized the natural law rights of non-Christian, non-European peoples as human beings, despite simultaneous European rights to conquer and convert them (Grosvogui, 1996, 212n43).

beasts and brutish savages, which have no interest in it, because they participate rather of the nature of beasts than man” (Williams, Jr., 2012, 192-193). Moreover, Edward Waterhouse, who was commissioned by the Company to write a pamphlet supporting territorial expansion, went ever farther to agitate that the simple massacre was far better than a slow civilizing process:

Because the way of conquering them is much more easy than of civilizing them by fair means, for they are a rude, barbarous, and naked people, scattered in small companies, which are helps to victory, but hinderances to civility: Besides that, a conquest may be of many, and at once; but civility is in particular, and slow, the effect of long time, and great industry (cited in Williams, Jr., 2012, 195).

From the early modern stage on, the possibility of reciprocal *dialogues* between different but equal participants was significantly blocked by the Christian *monologue*. Early modernity was the “narcissistic moment” when the Christian theology “posited the European ego as the sole locus of intercommunal relations” and posed “the erasure of the other as requisite of self-interest” (Grovgoui, 1996, 24).⁴

The Enlightenment

Even the advent of the new post-medieval philosophy movement, the Enlightenment, could not transform the Eurocentric discursive formation on “the idea of the savage” of the past centuries (Williams, Jr., 2012, 199). Although an assortment of philosophers, publicists, and politicians built a new structure of worldly narrative distinguished from the medieval religious theories during the eighteenth century, the kernel of the Christian and Universalist understandings of identity\difference was basically preserved. Indeed, the secular turn in the European social stock of knowledge merely produced a “transmutation of the original ecclesiastical dichotomy of savior/fallen into one of civilized/noncivilized” (Grovgoui, 1996, 41). Now, enlightened Europeans as the agents of progressive History should colonize the world to civilize (not Christianize) it, *philosophes* asserted.

First, the so-called “state of nature” concept in social contract theory was crucial in this

⁴ See also Campbell (1998, 97-109).

ideological development. The discourse rested on the limited (and distorted) ethnography on the Native Americans written by European adventurers and settlers in the course of the intercultural encounter between Europe and America (Grovoqui, 1996, 35). From the beginning, the notion of the state of nature was itself the product of a highly charged Eurocentric narratives (Jahn, 1999). The life of natives was exploited as “a living model of human development in its more savage, less civilized stages” (Williams, Jr., 2012, 202) that lacked the European “civilized” institutions, such as private property, civil society, and government. In his *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes (2008 [1651], 84) famously described that in the state of nature, human’s life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” To prove that such a terrible situation really existed in world history, he pointed to the case of Amerindian life:

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. (Hobbes, 2008 [1651], 85).

In other words, the aboriginal inhabitants were designated as inferior Others who were antithetical to the advanced European Self (Brandon, 1986; Jahn, 2000). In contrast, Europe was now regarded as the leading progressive force in human history, and the domination of the “Rest” was justified as the European *mission civilisatrice*. Thus, colonialism was viewed as a secular blessing for incapable natives (Grovoqui, 1996, 26-27). The social construction of the European representational framework grounded in the dichotomy between civilized Europe and savage America simultaneously delegitimized Amerindian sovereignty and legitimized European imperialism over the Americas (Strang, 1996, 25; Keal, 2003, 6).⁵

Second, John Locke’s social efficiency/utility argument or the doctrine of *terra nullius* exemplifies the paragon of the Enlightenment version of colonial justification (Boucher, 2006).

⁵ Robert Lee Nichols (2005), using the case of the Iroquois Confederacy that sought resolution of a dispute between themselves and Canada at the League of Nations, shows how social contract theory, even in the twentieth century, represented indigenous peoples as non-sovereign forms, thus denying them the sovereignty to participate in international society.

His *Second Treatise of Government* asserted “in the beginning all the world was America” (Locke, 2003 [1689], 121). This illustrates that Locke’s entire thought on political economy was based on the contemporary Eurocentric, linear philosophy of history that divided the West and the “Rest” and assigned different progressive stages to each part of the world. In his famous chapter V, “Of Property,” Locke presupposed: “As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, enclose it from the common.” (Locke, 2003 [1689], 113). This theory of property was linked to a “deplorable” situation in North America. In the hands of aboriginal nomads, Locke lamented, the vast land was not efficiently utilized and not individualized as private property. Amerindians were simply hoarding large uncultivated territories put to “idle” purposes, i.e., hunting, which explained why they still lived in poverty.

Several nations of the Americans... are rich in land, and poor in all the comforts of life ; whom nature having furnished as liberally as any other people with the materials of plenty, i.e. a fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance what might serve for food, raiment, and delight ; yet, for want of improving it by labour, have not one-hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy (Locke, 2003 [1689], 117-118).

This poor Native American condition was also against the will of God, Locke (2003 [1689], 114) argued, drawing on the Bible⁶:

God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to it).

Of course, “the industrious and rational” meant European settlers who landed on the New World. Therefore, *non*-industrious and *ir*-rational natives who deserved God’s punishment had no right to claim their unused territories, that is, North America could be legitimately deemed “empty” land (= *terra nullius*). As a result, Amerindian resistance to European intrusion was unjustifiable in terms of international law, as long as white colonists efficiently utilized those

⁶ “Fill the earth and subdue it” (Genesis 1:28, NIV).

vast lands that “lie waste” or “still lie in common” (Locke, 2003 [1689], 119; Boucher, 2006, 174). Furthermore, their unjust resistance “constituted a just cause of war” by Europeans in legitimate self-defense (Boucher, 2006, 175).⁷

Robert Cushman, an early English promoter of migration to North America, shows how nascent European speculators readily applied abstract Lockean principles to their new business. He advertised that the new continent was an “empty” land because “animal-like” indolent aborigines did not use or commodify their land property in a proper sense:

This then is a sufficient reason to prove our going thither to live lawful: their land is spacious and void, and they are but few and do but run over the grass, as do the foxes and wild beasts. They are not industrious, nether have [they] art, science, skill or faculty to use either the land or the commodities of it; but all spoils, rots, and is marred for want of manuring, gathering, ordering, etc... so it is lawful now to take a land which none useth and make use of it (cited in Nobles, 1997, 31-32).

Last, the secularist turn in the Eurocentric worldview culminated in the four-stage theory of the Scottish Enlightenment (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004, 86-87). Especially, Adam Smith’s theory (Brewer, 2008) was influential among the American Founding Fathers at the turn of the nineteenth century. It was assumed that History is divided into four successive stages: “1st, the Age of Hunters; 2dly, the Age of Shepherds; 3dly, the Age of Agriculture; and 4thly, the Age of Commerce” (Smith, 1978 [1763], i.27). In this linear progressive schema of world history, the simple Amerindian society on the lowest hunter stage without private property, law, and government was doomed to be dominated by a superior form of civilization, i.e., Euro-American agricultural/commercial society (Williams, Jr., 2012, 206-210).⁸ In this context, the Scottish

⁷ It is a notable fact that Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) advanced an unorthodox theory of property that directly denied the prevailing principle of *terra nullius*. In his *On the Law of Nature and Nations*, Pufendorf insists that any land “should not at once be regarded as unoccupied and free to be taken by any man as his own, but it will be understood to belong to the whole people” (cited in Boucher, 2006, 169). Thus, the society of Amerindians as a whole still exercises property rights over the so-called “uncultivated” land, according to the Pufendorf’s theory of community property rights.

⁸ In fact, the theorists of the Scottish Enlightenment themselves relied on contemporary reports from North America and constructed the conceptual distinction between civil society and primitive societies (Calloway, 2011, 207).

philosophy of history became the basis of the East Coast elite discourse on “benevolent” assimilation, and Jefferson actively pursued the integration of the inferior Native American society into the advanced White society by propagating a new mode of economic life, agriculture (Sheehan, 1973).

Taken together, the European way of binary thinking derived from medieval theology and the Enlightenment invented “the bipolar or schizophrenic image” (Hobson, 2013, 40) of the world as divided by the sphere of civilization and the sphere of barbarism. As Max Savelle (1974, 141) shrewdly explains:

Out of the colonial situation, also there arose the “doctrine of the two spheres,” that is, the idea that Europe had its own system of international law and custom, while the colonial world beyond the “lines of amity”—the North and South lines of the treaty of Tordesillas and the Tropic of Cancer—was a new and distinct sphere of international law, and relations in which the international customary laws and international treaties (unless they specifically mentioned the New World) did not apply. As a corollary to this doctrine, the colonizing nations had earlier accepted the assumption that “might makes right beyond the line” and that “there is no peace beyond the line.”

The discourse of “standard of civilization” that demarcates these two areas and justifies European colonial practices emerged at this historical juncture and underlay “the genesis of the modern international society” (Gong, 1984, 4). An overarching Eurocentric theory of world history that has dominated our global modern experiences finally came into being.⁹

3. The North American Borderlands Diplomatic Regime: the “Middle Ground” and the “Covenant Chain”

After the initial bloody conflicts in the early seventeenth century, such as the Pequot War (1636) and King Philip’s War (1675-1676), relative peace between the two ethnic communities arose in the Great Lake areas and the Ohio Valley from the late-seventeenth century to the mid-eighteenth century. Of course, the Euromerican Christian-oriented binary way of thinking did not

⁹ See Bell (2011) for a succinct map of the imperial imagination in the nineteenth-century European political thought.

disappear, and deadly intercommunal combats remained prevalent. However, “two great systems of colonial-tribal alliance” (the New France composed of the French Empire and Huron/Algonquin nations¹⁰ vs. the New England including the British Colonies and the Iroquois League) emerged by the latter part of the seventeenth century (Jennings, 1985, 38). As the hegemonic competition between Britain and France became intensified in North America, the agency or autonomy of native nations also increased because European empires needed Amerindian alliances to win their hegemonic war. As indigenous peoples could play imperial rivals off against one another, more equal and hybrid relations within both military and economic spheres came to be established, which were cemented by “intermarriages and gift exchanges” across the ethnic lines (Adelman and Aron, 1999, 838).

Richard White (2011) coined the term “Middle Ground” to describe how the French and Algonquians “constructed a common, mutually comprehensible world in the region around the Great Lakes the French called the *pays d'en haut*” (xxv-xxvi). Against the simple, dichotomized stories of assimilation and resistance, the middle ground showed the process of hybrid accommodation among diverse peoples that produced, through creative mutual misunderstandings, new shared meanings and practices in “the place in between” (xxvi). In other words, the “joint Indian-white creation” (xxx) was mainly defined by the existence of common cultural conventions: Both the French and Algonquians tried to “justify their own actions in terms of what they perceived to be their partner’s cultural premises... [T]hey had to convince people of another culture that some mutual action was fair and legitimate” (52). In this imperial periphery, even the European discourse of “barbarian” natives lost its power because white settlers “living alongside Indians of necessity developed a far more intimate and sophisticated knowledge of Indian peoples than did European savants” (xxvii-xxx).

In a similar vein, the “Covenant Chain” was forged not only as a “non-aggression pact”

¹⁰ The meaning of the term “nation” in early modern English language was different from our usage that is firmly related to the rise of nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe. According to Nancy Shoemaker (2004, 6), the word merely referred to “a vaguely defined body of people linked only by a common language and culture.” Later, the term “tribe” came to appear to exclude extra-European polities from modern international society.

between the Iroquois League and the English colonies but also as a military alliance against the French-Huron allied force (Nobles, 1997, 75). Even before the coming of Europeans across the Atlantic, the five nations (the Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and Seneca) in what is now upstate New York formed the Iroquois League to prevent conflicts among the tribes and maintain peace in the region. In Neta Crawford's (1994, 346) account, the League was a primordial, "well-functioning security regime" among democracies that existed for more than three centuries (circa 1450-1777). Through the "democratic" institutions of the "Great Law of Peace (or the Great Binding Law)" and the "Great Council," the inter-tribal regime succeeded in achieving cooperation and order among the five nations and facilitating collective security against external threats (Crawford, 1994, 354-355). Later, the League came to be part of a larger multi-ethnic alliance system between the Iroquois nations and English colonies, which kept peace in the Ohio valley region for three-quarters of a century, from 1677 to 1755. According to Francis Jennings (1985, 38), the Chain was similar to the "modern United Nations" in that all members retained their sovereignty and all key decision was reached by "consultation and treaty."¹¹

Based on several material infrastructures, involving the balance of power and economic interdependence (mainly fur trade) within and between the French "Middle Ground" and the British "Covenant Chain," there emerged a new borderlands diplomatic regime (Sadosky, 2009; Adelman and Aron, 1999), in which a series of multicultural norms and tributary practices created an alternative *Lockean* anarchy.¹² Although the story is usually simplified by describing that the lack of the mutual sovereignty recognition gave rise to the European genocide against Native Americans (Wendt, 1992, 415), in reality, there was a transition from the initial *Hobbesian* situation, in which only power matters, to the *Lockean* world of mutually recognized sovereignty (i.e., the North American borderlands security regime). Thus, instead of continuous mutual fear and wars, we can observe partial cooperation and coexistence in this particular

¹¹ See also Calloway (2011, 202).

¹² Echoing a constructivist approach to the cultures of anarchy, White (2011, 53n6) interestingly points out that the establishment of the middle ground can be an "example of what Anthony Giddens calls structuration."

historical setting, characterized by permeability/porousness of boundaries, or borders as “interstitial zones that produce liminality and creolization” (Lamont and Molnár, 2002, 187).

4. The British Imperial Frontier: The Royal Proclamation and the “Paxton Boys”

The year of 1744 marked an end of one era in North America. With the onset of “King George’s War” (1744-1748), the hegemonic rivalry between France and Britain spread to world-wide conflicts, and the relative stability enjoyed by both Euro-Americans and Native Americans broke down (Jennings, 1985, 47). Moreover, the end of the Seven Year’s War (1756-1763)—“the last great imperial war fought in North America, the final major frontier struggle among the European powers” (Nobles, 1997, 82)—heralded not the return of peace but another grave threat to Eastern Amerindians. The British Empire that had expelled the French presence on the Continent tried to build a hierarchical relationship of colonialism between the two ethnic groups, in lieu of the preceding borderlands rules. In response, Amerindians revolted against the British imperial plan to secure the borderlands regime through the waves of insurgencies called collectively as “Pontiac’s War,” which dangerously threatened the British authority in the newly acquired Ohio valley area (Nobles, 1997, 84-87).

After all, the Empire had to recoil from its new strategy of unilateral domination. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was the result of this compromise between Britain and Native American nations, and the Lockean world of borderlands was restored (Adelman and Aron, 1999, 821-822). The Proclamation, echoing the legacy of the “middle ground,” recognized the partial sovereignty of the aboriginal peoples along with their land ownership, and sought to establish a positive law-based treaty relationship by granting *de jure* nationhood to Amerindian nations (Pagden, 1995, 83-85). From 1763 to 1768, a “comprehensive treaty system” was established between the Amerindians and the British (Jones, 1982, 36-92). Thus, the British royal court tried to establish “Pax Britannica in North America” (Calloway, 2006, 97) and to “conciliate the Affections of the Indian Nations, by every Act of strict Justice” as Lord Egremont, British Secretary of State for the Southern Department during the Seven Years’ War, pointed out

(cited in Gould, 2012, 100). Especially, the Western part of the Appalachian Mountains was claimed as “Indian” territory, and land-hungry Euro-Americans were kept from making incursion into the native domain by the authorities in London. In the eyes of British officials, the frontiersmen were regarded as unnecessary troublemakers incurring aborigine’s hatred. Thus, they were often derisively “characterized as ‘scum,’ the ‘dregs of society,’ lawless ‘banditti’” (Nobles, 1997, 86).

Such a historical accommodation also reflected an ideational politics of identity\difference in the contemporary British thinking. The Spanish Empire, due to its brutal conquest of America, was regarded as a negative Other that the Enlightenment philosophers had long despised with repugnance. In particular, after the Spanish Armada’s attempt to invade England, anti-Hispanism became a deeply rooted part of early modern English thought. British writers and pamphleteers attempted to arouse public sentiment by exaggerating, and sometimes inventing, notorious stories of Spanish cruelty in South America. Against this “Black Legend” (Maltby, 1971), the British imperial government aimed to construct its own image as a progressive force using more benevolent measures to promote civilization in the New World (Pagden, 1995, 86-89). In addition, the British ruling class possessed a historical analogy concerning the tragic consequence of the imperial expansion: “the collapse of the metropolis’s own political and moral culture, the dissolution of its ethical values, even... its final absorption by the very empire it had itself created” (Pagden, 1995, 106). Indeed, the republican fear of the Roman Empire as a historical negative Other haunted the British colonial policy. In this cultural context, we can understand why the Royal Proclamation aimed to control the disorderly settlement movement across the Appalachian Mountains as well as to restore the borderlands norms of intercommunal society, despite the material reality that the balance of power favored its unilateral colonization after France was expelled from North America (Pagden, 1995, 106-109).

Nevertheless, another crucial legacy was produced around the mid-eighteenth century, which would ultimately demolish the Lockean world; that is, the color divide in North American social imaginary was increasingly consolidated. In Shoemaker’s (2004, 129-130) account, Amerindians and Europeans rarely referred to each other’s skin color until the beginning of the

eighteenth century. When they first encountered in early modern America, the abovementioned religious and civilizational distinctions, originated from the preceding European thoughts, were mostly mobilized. Namely, Euromericans perceived “Indians” as either non-Christians or savages in the first place (Berkhofer, Jr., 1979, 10-18). However, the “categorization of peoples by simple color-coded labels (red, white, black)” (Shoemaker, 2004, 129) had become much popular by mid-eighteenth century.¹³ Despite all the similarities between Amerindians and Euro-Americans based on their common humanity, the two ethnic groups came to “construct new identities that exaggerated the contrasts between them” (Shoemaker, 2004, 3) during the eighteenth century. What caused this ideational paradigm shift in Amerindian-European relations?

Although the imperial authorities was willing to dispel the discontent of aboriginal allies by the Proclamation, it failed to pacify the new wave of violence in the western backcountry. On the contrary, the “Spirit of killing all Indians, Friends and Foes, [has] spread amazingly thro’ the whole Country,” as Benjamin Franklin observed in 1764 (Vaughan, 1982, 937). In 1766, British Superintendent of Indian Affairs Sir William Johnson similarly reported to the London government that the white settlers in the frontier area “murder, Robb and otherwise grossly misuse all Indians they could find... and [are] treating the Indians with contempt, much greater than they had ever before experienced” (cited in Vaughan, 1982, 937).

In fact, the chaos in the western areas was mainly incited by no more than a few hundred lawless squatters who violated the Royal Proclamation, not the majority of Euromericans. However, only a small number of extremists could “hijack and considerably worsen intergroup relations” by committing violence across the borderlands (Silver, 2008, xxvi). According to Peter Silver’s (2008, 303-305) content analysis of a mid-Atlantic newspaper, *the Pennsylvania Gazette*, the number of its reports mentioning “white” people surprisingly increased during the

¹³ Alden Vaughan (1982, 918) notes, “not until the middle of the eighteenth century did most Anglo-Americans view Indians as significantly different in color from themselves, and not until the nineteenth century did red become the universally accepted color label for American Indians.”

Seven Years' War, and the term was usually used to contrast European settlers with Amerindians. In a similar vein, Euro-Americans shifted their perception of Native Others from unenlightened but assimilable and "almost white" people¹⁴ to inherently inferior and unassimilable "red them" in the same period (Vaughan, 1982, 942).¹⁵ This epochal change reflected the historical fact that some opportunistic politicians and publicists¹⁶ as *securitizing actors* (Buzan et al., 1998) started to stir up or conjure up contagious paranoia among the white frontiersmen, in the middle of intensified interethnic violence, in order to securitize the "Indian" Other as an existential threat to the emerging white racial identity and to form political coalitions for imperialist expansion.

The growing idea of threats, both real and imagined, reified racial boundaries and increased the polarization of identities into camps of "white us" and "red them." In consequence, the long war with Amerindians brought a new style to popular *commonsense* (Hopf, 2013) filled with "rhetoric of victimization" or "the anti-Indian sublime" and eventually created a white nationalism that united ethnically and culturally fragmented European settlers.¹⁷ A new political discourse "that was genuinely worth calling racist" emerged, which was amplified through newspapers, pamphlets, and popular literature in the vortex of violent conflicts between the two ethnic communities (Silver, 2008, xix-xxi). A series of indiscriminate massacres committed by

¹⁴ In the seventeenth century, a sort of consensus emerged among European observers that Amerindians were originally white. Only because of their habit of body paintings and the burning heat of the sun, natives had come to have darker skins, according to the contemporary "environmental" explanations. Some early English colonists even advanced the "Lost Tribes theory," i.e., Amerindians were descendants of the forgotten clans of Israel (Vaughan, 1982, 923-926).

¹⁵ "The exclusionary vision of the future that placed Native Americans outside an ever-expanding United States had its origin... in the resolution of the Seven Years' War, when, instead of being recognized as a part of the new society being created in North America, Indians were placed outside it – beyond some frontier line" (Bender, 2006, 90).

¹⁶ Silver (2008, 318n11) stresses that it was "a few especially loud and skillful voices" that dominated the discourse of Indian-hating. The Rev. William Smith in the mid-eighteenth century and the partnership of Hugh Henry Brackenridge and the Lancaster printer Francis Bailey were representative examples.

¹⁷ During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European settlers were usually categorized by their national origins, such as Englishmen, Frenchmen and the like, or by their religious denominations. It was rare to lump all of them together as the *white* people vis-à-vis the *red* American natives (Vaughan, 1982, 931).

the “Paxton boys”—most of whom were newly arrived Scots-Irish frontiersmen who had previous, violent colonial experiences back in Ireland (Fischer, 1989, 605-782)—and their conflicts with the pacifist Quakers of Pennsylvania, who were accused of betraying the *white* people to the *red* savages in the mid-1760s, reflected this rising interracial tension in the western backcountry (Kenny, 2009). As a result, the so-called “virtues of the frontier” cultivated in the horrible, violent clashes between Euromericans and Amerindians captured “invented notions of collective self” and “defined the character of American character” at the United States’ germinal stage (Griffin, 2007, 5).

In parallel, the Native American nations forged their own collective identity defined as the *red* people against the *white* invaders by the 1760s,¹⁸ which was distinguished from their traditional parochial/tribe-rooted identities (Shoemaker, 2004, 134-135; Dowd, 1992, xx). It was the beginning of pan-Indian revivalist movement, or “the Indians’ Great Awakening” (Dowd, 1992, 23-46) that led to Tecumseh’s War and the Red Creek insurgency in the early nineteenth century, as we will see later.

In sum, over the course of the eighteenth century, Amerindians and Euromericans “had together created new identities for themselves based on the fiction of irresolute difference” (Shoemaker, 2004, 11). The exacerbation of intercommunal conflicts due to the growth of illegal interlopers in the “middle ground” produced a racist discursive formation and established exclusive dichotomized group identities based on skin color as a social construction or as a collective imagination, which, in turn, worsen the chaotic situation over time. To illustrate, Franklin’s critique made in 1764 deplored that the pervasive massacre committed by Euro-Americans during the Seven Years’ War was caused by unjustifiable racist rationales:

The only Crime of these poor Wretches seems to have been, that they had a reddish brown Skin, and black Hair; and some People of that Sort, it seems, had murdered some of our Relations. If it be right to kill Men for such a Reason, then, should any Man, with a freckled Face and red Hair, kill a Wife or Child of mine, it would be right for me to revenge it, by killing all the

¹⁸ Amerindian uses of “whites” or “white men” came to be prevalent at the turn of nineteenth century (Vaughan, 1982, 933).

freckled red-haired Men, Women and Children, I could afterwards any where meet with (cited in Shoemaker, 2004, 126).

Hence, we can argue that there emerged two separate kinds of anarchy in the post-Seven Years' War America. One was the restored *Lockean* anarchy of mutual sovereignty recognition between the colonial authorities and its native allies. The legacy of the "Middle Ground" and the "Covenant Chain" was respected by both the British Empire and the Iroquois League, and the norms and regime of the borderlands survived to some degree. The other was a reappeared *Hobbesian* anarchy of mutual fear and violence between the European frontiersmen and the aboriginal inhabitants. The Euro-American settlers rarely obeyed the central controls decreed in the Royal Proclamation and pursued their own "populist imperialism" against Amerindian resistances. The fundamental gap between the national effort to contain the flow of illegal occupancy and the unilateral expansion of the frontier mass would continue even after Independence (Hendrickson, 2009, 148-49). From this turbulent American interior, the Jacksonian tradition of militaristic adventurism and racism was gradually developed (Lieven, 2004, 96).

5. The Post-Revolution "Indian" Policy: Knox, Jefferson, and Jackson

The American Revolution and the Frontier

The British Empire's effort to reassert its authority in the borderlands along with its continuous alliance with Amerindian nations frustrated white frontiersmen's desire for the land and provoked their resentment against the natives. The famous sentence in the Declaration of Independence that accused George III of bringing "on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, & conditions of existence" reflected this hostile politics of identity\difference prevalent among the white colonists and anticipated/justified what would happen in the post-Revolutionary West (Hendrickson, 2009, 148; Vaughan, 1982, 942; Williams, Jr., 2012, 211). As soon as the Empire's prohibition against the colonial westward expansion was abolished in the wake of Independence, a huge number of white squatters were poured into Amerindian territories

and occupied them (Adelman and Aron, 1999, 822).

The American Revolution marked another watershed in the history of White-Amerindian relations on the Continent. The historical event was not only a republican departure from the Old World initiated by the intellectual East-Coast elites, but was also a bottom-up revolution of poor western settlers who were immersed in the process of securitization of the race question. Patrick Griffin (2007), synthesizing recent researches on the frontiersman and their ambivalent roles in the US founding, argues that the American Revolution “created a liberating and troubling legacy” concurrently. On the one hand, we can (re)discover a Turnerian, heroic image of common people during the Revolution. In the chaotic environment, they actively participated in the process of the upheaval and contended with eastern power-elites to gain several rights, including access to property, i.e., land (10). On the other hand, we can also find “the uncomfortable truth that victim could be victimizer” (14). The Euromerican commoners in the west achieved their rights “at the expense of other peoples” outside the boundary of the white US empire: “After all, the pressures that inspired Indian hating did not descend from the top down, but arose from the bottom up” (16). As Robert Young (2001, 79) noted, American “liberty” after 1776 “also meant the liberty to displace and exterminate native Americans.”

For the “American Leviathan” emerged from the Hobbesian anarchy in the interior, the borderlands diplomatic regime was gradually replaced by the nation-state’s pacification, and the sovereignty of Amerindians was radically reduced (Griffin, 2007, 14-16). The American Revolution was a “decisive moment in the shift from borderlands to bordered lands” (Adelman and Aron, 1999, 822), i.e., from intercommunal relations among diverse (semi-) sovereign polities to hierarchical colonial relations. Although England and France could only gain a limited hold on the Continent until the eighteenth century because of the vast distance from their metropole, the American Revolution made crucial headway to overcome this material constraint and “established a dynamic national empire in the Ohio Valley” (Hinderaker, 1997, xiii). Through a series of (coercive) diplomatic maneuvers, such as the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1784) and the Treaty of Fort McIntosh (1785), the new American nation swiftly forced Native tribes to leave the Ohio country and opened a huge chunk of land to white squatter families. Also, the

Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 that institutionally prepared for future continental expansion (Nobles, 1997, 94). Thereafter, the borderlands diplomatic regime characterized by hybridity and pluralism was excluded from the grand narrative of modern state-building and the racist classification of peoples in the United States.¹⁹ John Jay's definition of the "American" people, in his Federalist No. 2, symbolically exemplified how the racial Others were totally excommunicated from the United States:


Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people, a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs (cited in Vaughan, 1982, 936).

The Enlightenment Approaches to the "Indian" Question

However, we should be careful not to regard all "Indian" policies of each US administration as having the same orientation. Actually, there were meaningful differences between the Knoxian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian paradigms in their basic assumptions and practices. Until 1830's, the eastern elite groups, steeped in universal Enlightenment philosophy, took the lead in US "Indian" policy. They could "separate the practical horrors and violence of border warfare from the theoretical problems of Indian relations" and regarded the aborigines as equal human beings (Horsman, 1981, 106).

¹⁹ Since the Revolution, White (2011, xxxi) argues, Americans have viewed "the history of the colonial and early republican period through the prism of otherness." Although Euro-Americans once created the "middle ground" of cultural mixture and diversity, they eventually "reinvented the Indian as other." It sounds prophetic that in 1783 George Washington declared, "We will... establish a boundary line between *them* and *us*" in his letter to Congress on the Indian issue (cited in Bender, 2006, 91, emphasis mine).

Three models of the Native American Policy



The Federalists led by Henry Knox, the Secretary of War in the Washington administration, tried to preserve “the diplomatic norms of the borderlands in conducting Indian diplomacy” (Sadosky, 2009, 151). In his memorandum on the relations between the US and its Native American neighbors to President George Washington, Knox recognized the autonomy of Amerindian nations by stating: “The independent nations and tribes of Indians ought to be considered as foreign nations not as the subjects of any particular state” (cited in Sadosky, 2009, 158). Also, he attempted to prevent the individual states and their citizens from intruding into Native American territory and violating existing intercommunal treaties, so as to eliminate the sources of persistent conflicts between the Amerindians and Euromericans. Instead, it was expected that the federal government would control and facilitate peaceful commercial intercourse between the two racial groups. Only the federal authority as “the general Sovereignty must possess the right of making all treaties on the execution or violation of which depend peace or war” (Sadosky, 2009, 157-158).

Basically, Knox and his Federalist colleagues regarded their Indian policy as a more humanitarian approach, which would define the new identity of the nascent US republic. In his letter to President Washington (December 29, 1794), Knox expressed his deep concern that what frontiersmen had committed to native peoples were more brutal than what *conquistadors*, negative historical Others repugnantly described in the Black Legend, did in South America.

As we are more powerful, and more enlightened than they are, there is a responsibility of national character, that we should treat them with kindness, and even liberality. It is a melancholy

reflection, that our modes of population have been more destructive to the Indian natives than the conduct of the conquerors of Mexico and Peru. The evidence of this is the utter extirpation of nearly all the Indians in most populous parts of the Union. A future historian may mark the causes of this destruction of the human race in sable colors (cited in White, 2011, 469).

The new nation should pursue a “noble liberal and disinterested administration of Indian affairs.” American identity should be distinguished from the past evil Others, Knox insisted: “Whatever may have been the conduct some of the late British Colonies in their separate capacities toward the Indians, yet the same cannot be charged against the *national character* of the United States” (cited in Sadosky, 2009, 158, emphasis mine). In this regard, President Washington (1783) recommended a policy of “peaceful” purchase of Native American lands in his letter to James Duane, instead of violent dispossession of Amerindians through prevalent, unnecessary wars in the frontier areas:

I am clear in my opinion, that policy and economy point very strongly to the expediency of being upon good terms with the Indians, and the propriety of purchasing their Lands in preference to attempting to drive them by force of arms out of their Country; which as we have already experienced is like driving the Wild Beasts of the Forest which will return as soon as the pursuit is at an end and fall perhaps on those that are left there; when the gradual extension of our Settlements will as certainly cause the Savage as the Wolf to retire; both being beasts of prey tho’ they differ in shape. In a word there is nothing to be obtained by an Indian War but the Soil they live on and this can be had by purchase at less expense, and without that bloodshed, and those distresses which helpless Women and Children are made partakers of in all kinds of disputes with them.

Following his recommendation, Congress issued a proclamation that restricted illegal settlement on Native American territories in the West, which was similar to the 1763 Royal Proclamation (Williams, Jr., 2012, 213). Of course, this “accommodationist” Indian policy of the newly-born United States was related to the contemporary geopolitical reality that the British Empire maintained their posts in the Ohio Valley and had close connections with the Amerindian tribes there even after the Treaty of Paris (1783). The Empire’s official position that continued to treat its former Indian allies as quasi-independent sovereigns was an uneasy situation to the Washington administration (Gould, 2012, 199).

On the other hand, Jefferson and his Republican comrades perceived Amerindians

through the intellectual grid of assimilationism based on the four-stage theory of the Scottish Enlightenment (Calloway, 2011, 207). Although Jeffersonians often romanticized the Native Americans as the “noble savages”²⁰ (Sheehan, 1973, 89-116), Amerindians were doomed to perish because of their backward way of life or the hunter-gatherer mode of production, according to the Scottish theorization of progressive history: “I consider the business of hunting as already become insufficient to furnish clothing and subsistence to the Indians” (Jefferson, 1984, 1115). Therefore, Jefferson declared the United States as a *civilizing* state with a special duty “to offer salvation to the tribes by encouraging them to adopt white civilization’s agricultural mode of subsistence” (Williams, Jr., 2012, 216). For instance, in a letter to Alexander von Humboldt in 1813, Jefferson (1984, 1312) clarified his *mission civilisatrice*:

You know, my friend, the benevolent plan we were pursuing here for the happiness of the aboriginal inhabitants in our vicinities. We spared nothing to keep them at peace with one another. To teach them agriculture and the rudiments of the most necessary arts, and to encourage industry by establishing among them separate property. In this way they would have been enabled to subsist and multiply on a moderate scale of landed possession. They would have mixed their blood with ours, and been amalgamated and identified with us within no distant period of time.

However, such an apparently “benevolent” assimilationism had an inherent anxiety or a compulsion to Others. In a fundamental sense, Jeffersonian philanthropy did not recognize the values of native Others as they were and treated them “as objects of commiseration whose sole purpose after the arrival of the white man should have been the speedy adoption of civilization” (Sheehan, 1973, 9-10). Above all, the goal of his “Indian” policy was “the termination of their history most happy for themselves” (Jefferson, 1984, 1118). It was another form of deep narcissism of the Euro-American Self that did not acknowledge the idea of a multicultural world. Consequently, an irony embedded in the Jeffersonian “Indian” policy was that its genuine goodwill to support the wellbeing of the Native Americans by transforming them into yeomen

²⁰ In fact, identifying Native Americans as noble savages in the “state of nature” itself signifies that Europeans did not treat the native world on its own terms. The Amerindians “became merely a foil in civilized man’s constant efforts at self-examination. As a moral exemplar... the native served only the white man’s special needs” (Sheehan, 1973, 101). Ultimately, the notion of noble savages was linked to “a dead past” (Shoemaker, 2004, 143).

came to be “the seeds of extinction” with its kindness, which ultimately destroyed the aboriginal world (Sheehan, 1973, 11-12).

The War of 1812 and the Rise of the Jackson Doctrine

Although it can be interpreted as a small, local episode of the Britain-France hegemonic rivalry, the War of 1812 also reflected an ongoing unstable position of the US in North American geopolitics. Even after Independence and the establishment of the Federal Union, the specter of European presence in American frontiers around the Mississippi and Ohio Valleys and the maintenance of European alliance with the Amerindian nations in the same areas did not disappear until the Madison administration started. For instance, the state of Vermont led by Ethan Allen discussed the possibility of keeping it an independent state under the sponsorship of the British Empire. Similarly, some local settlers in “Franklin,” an ephemeral, post-Revolutionary “state,” sought independence and alliance with Spain (Nobles, 1997, 101-102). Even in the aftermath of the Louisiana Purchase (1803), the vast area of the West was still a “contested ground” in the early nineteenth century and the aboriginal nations there “remained free agents in the great game of interimperial rivalry” (Sadosky, 2009, 194-195).

Thus, the American “War Hawks” had a fundamental strategic reason to initiate the War of 1812: conquering Canada and Florida would destroy the encirclement by Britain and its Native American allies. It was the “second war for independence” to finally expel the British Empire from the Continent. In particular, Western folks were ardent supporters of the war against the British-Amerindian alliance. Tennessee Congressman Felix Grundy’s pro-war slogan exemplifies the contemporary warlike mentality prevalent among the frontier mass: “We shall drive the British from our Continent – they will no longer have an opportunity of intriguing with our Indian neighbors” (cited in Lind, 2006, 60-61).

Andrew Jackson, the hero of frontiersmen and a son of a recently immigrated Scots-Irish farming family, stood with the removalist/revivalist western frontiersmen against the assimilationist/evangelist coalition of eastern elites, the eastern missionary movement, and the Native Americans (Haselby, 2012). From the mid-eighteenth century on, backcountry white

farmers had developed their own political economic views distinguished from the eastern mercantile-intellectual class. They were deeply hostile to taxation imposed by central governments, both the past British and present American, and fiercely pursued their own political autonomy from “corrupted” power putatively wielded by the East Coast financial interests. The Regulators’ movement in the 1760’s and a series of agrarian insurgencies in the post-Revolutionary West (e.g., the Shays’ and Whiskey Rebellions) exemplify the consistent resistance from disaffected frontiersmen (Nobles, 1997, 99-101). A 1794 petition to Congress by the territorial assembly of Tennessee showed the frontiersmen’s persistent antipathy to the eastern ruling elites:

[C]itizens who live in poverty on the extreme frontiers, were as entitled to be protected in their lives, their families and little property, as those were in luxury, ease and affluence in the great and opulent eastern cities (cited in Horsman, 1981, 110).

Of course, the national policy to control the disorderly westward expansion was another important reason for popular unrest. For instances, Scots-Irish in Pennsylvania conflicted with pacifist Quakers, white land-grabbers in the valleys of east Tennessee criticized the North Carolina government that did not provide security against Amerindian attacks, and Kentuckians sought to obtain political autonomy as they felt neglected by Virginia (Horsman, 1981, 109). In these historical contexts, frontiersmen had constructed their own image of the “Indian” Others, which “contrasted sharply with the eighteenth-century intellectual transatlantic view” (Horsman, 1981, 109). As fighting against the East Coast financial class and their federal government in order to gain liberal access to the “virgin land,” Euro-American borderlands people further consolidated their racist hatred view of “Indians.” On the basis of the land-hungry frontiersmen’s wishes, Jackson used the War of 1812 to lay out his uncompromising “Indian” policy doctrine that sought to “undermine the sovereignty of the Indian nations and render them dependent” and to contain the Amerindian nations from the “commercial and political networks of the wider European-Atlantic world” (Sadosky, 2009, 200).²¹

²¹ Thus, the “Jackson Doctrine” of 1814 and the 1823 Monroe Doctrine shared the same goal of constructing an

In parallel, the growing anger and unity among the new generation of Amerindians were mobilized by a group of nativist prophets who professed a radical pan-Indian vision. They conflicted with traditional chiefs who held an accommodationist position with the United States. The traditional, senior group (“the Red Gentlemen”)²² was based on an ancient form of parochial, tribal authority and was willing to collaborate with the Federalist US government, so as to restore the borderlands regime of peace and order or the “middle ground.” Both leaderships across the racial line shared core interests and assumptions, including a. state governments pursuing expansionist policy should be contained, b. the national government must be in charge of Amerindian-Euromerican relations, and c. the lawless white land-grabbers needs to be under control (Nichols, 2008, 9-10).

However, this interethnic alliance in the early US era soon came to be in peril because of their “unruly young men.” On the one hand, the Federalists (and their Knoxian plan) lost their power to the expansionists of the Democratic-Republican Party supported by land-seeking westerners. The junior group in Native American society, on the other hand, had gained their power from the rising collective wrath among native peoples against the increasing incursions into the interior areas by white frontiersmen (“the White Savages”)²³ and attempted to build a new trans-tribal identity to resist white populist imperialism (Nichols, 2008, 13). Young Indian prophets and their collective revitalization movement throughout the borderlands preached that one god created red and white races separately in the beginning and that recent contact with white intruders had contaminated and weakened Amerindians. Thus, only by severing relations

autonomous US sphere of influence in the New World, isolated from the European imperial networks.

²² Negotiating with Amerindian chieftains, US officials often concluded that they were much more polite and sophisticated than “Christian white savages” (i.e., Euromerican frontier people as Benjamin Franklin called them). Many white commentators compared Indian delegates to classical orators and patricians (Nichols, 2008, 12-13).

²³ From the perspectives of US statesmen and rich landowners/speculators who wanted orderly expansion and lucrative land sales, these Euro-American squatters were commonly disdained as “white Indians” or “lawless banditti” (Nobles, 1997, 95) who disrupted interior peace and violated the right of private property.

with Europeans and restoring “traditional”²⁴ lifestyles could Native Americans save themselves and regain their power. Such religious revivalism was gradually escalated into “federationism”: the political movement that called for the making of shared racial interests among Native Americans transcending intertribal conflicts and differences. The emerging pan-Indian union, “spreading the truly radical message that Indians were one people” (Dowd, 1992, xix), aimed to secure their territory and sovereignty from white encroachment on a continental scale (Nichols, 2008, 14).

This unification movement of religious coloring or “a spirited resistance” (Dowd, 1992) first emerged during the French-Indian War and culminated in the rise of the Shawnee brothers Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa in the north and the Creek “Red Sticks” in the south towards the War of 1812. They intended to found trans-tribal sovereign polities autonomous from the United State (Gould, 2012, 201). The war speech delivered by Tecumseh to the Creeks in 1811 shows the newly-invented, racialized and dichotomized logic of the pan-Indian campaign:

Let the *white* race perish. They seize your land; they corrupt your women; they trample on the ashes of your dead! Back, whence they came, upon a trail of blood, they must be driven. Back! back, ay, into the great water whose accursed waves brought them to our shores! Burn their dwellings! Destroy their stock! Slay their wives and children! The *Red Man* owns the country, and the *Pale-faces* must never enjoy it. War now! War forever! (cited in Bunn and Williams, 2008, 163, emphasis mine).

The advent of the hostile mirror image politics of identity between the Jackson Doctrine and the pan-Indian nativism²⁵ induced the collapse of the cooperative effort to maintain a Lockean order in post-revolutionary America, which was shared by the traditional woodland

²⁴ Dowd (1992, xxii) argues that the Pan-Indian “nativism” was neither a reactionary fantasy nor a fatalistic flights from reality into the romanticized past. Rather, nativists “self-consciously proclaimed that selected traditions and new (sometimes even imported) modes of behavior held keys to earthly and spiritual salvation.”

²⁵ In a sense, this development of pan-Indianism among Native Americans in the early US anticipated what would occur in twentieth-century anticolonial movements in the nonwhite world. The European ideology of racism and its practice in modern colonial regions gave rise to “the further awakening of race consciousness” among the colonized peoples and the emergence of counternarratives defined in terms of race, such as “Negritude, African Personality, Afro-Asian solidarity, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism” (Le Melle, 2009, 82).

Indian leaders and the Federalist administration. The co-constituting processes of antithetical identities formation between white frontiersmen and red prophets reduced the possibility of the *Lockean* coexistence in the “middle ground,” and only sheer power came to decide the course of history as it usually happens in the *Hobbesian* state of war. As a result, the Native American insurgencies in the eastern woodlands, despite their alliance with the British Empire (Gould, 2012, 183-187)²⁶, was finally crushed, and the tragic road to “the Trail of Tears” came to be widely open. Setting aside the imbalance of power between Amerindian tribes and the US, the internal divisions among native peoples hindered them from forming a united front. Not only did the northern and southern tribes fail to mount interregional deployments, the increasing struggle between young militant nativists and old accommodationists also thrust all regions into the vortex of civil war (Dowd, 1992, 181-183).

The process of diplomatic negotiation before the Treaty of Ghent (1814), which concluded final peace between Great Britain and the United States, demonstrates how the American official discourse on “Indian” affairs had dramatically changed. Even after the Paris Treaty of 1783, the British Empire viewed the Indigenous nations on the boundary of the US as sovereign entities, not “conquered peoples” as Americans claimed. For instance, in 1793, Upper Canada Governor John Simcoe tried to mediate a peace treaty between the Iroquois League and the United States, which prompted Jefferson’s immediate refutation. During the War of 1812, the Empire officially treated its Amerindian allies as independent nations (Gould, 1812, 199).²⁷ In this spirit, Britain’s envoys to the Ghent peace talks asked for the maintenance of the borderlands diplomatic regime that would guarantee the territorial rights and semi-sovereignty of native

²⁶ The Shawnee Brothers instructed their followers to regard the British as their “fathers and friends” and the Red Sticks displayed British symbols, such as peace medals from George III, drums embossed with the royal coat of arms, and the like (Gould, 2012, 201).

²⁷ Certainly, it is also true that many Britons regarded natives as inferior savages in their hearts (Gould, 2012, 199-200). They had conveniently exploited the Amerindian allies since the Revolutionary War to contain the expansion of the United States and to defend Canada. However, Britain readily betrayed and abandoned its native partners whenever choosing to make peace with the US in 1783 (the Paris Treaty), 1794 (Jay’s Treaty), 1795 (the Treaty of Greenville), and finally 1814 (the Treaty of Ghent) (Adelman and Aron, 1999, 822-823).

nations, as part of a grand geostrategic scheme to create “a so-called ‘Indian buffer state’ in the Great Lakes Basin” (Sadosky, 2009, 202) between the US and Canada. Henry Goulburn, a British diplomat, insisted that “the relationship of the Indian Nations to the United States was similar to that between Great Britain and Portugal – they were great and small powers, bound together by treaties of alliance and commerce” (Sadosky, 2009, 202). In other words, the British Empire hoped to restore its “old imperial, Atlantic system and its attendant borderlands diplomatic regime that had existed for a century” (Sadosky, 2009, 204). However, American diplomats ignored the old norms of the Lockean world and asserted that only the United States of America was the sole sovereign polity on the Continent.

Although the US failed to achieve its main goal of the War of 1812, i.e., the annexation of Canada, the country could finally seize the opportunity to pacify its western frontier areas. With the end of the global hegemonic war and the final peace between the US and Britain, Native American nations’ “participation in the last remnants of the eighteenth-century borderlands diplomatic regime was now at an end” (Sadosky, 2009, 180) because they could not use other European empires against the United States any more. It was the last phase in the evolution of the “middle ground” from the intercultural borderlands to the national border pacified by the “American Leviathan” (Adelman and Aron, 1999, 839). As material conditions had radically shifted from a rough balance of power to a hierarchy with the British retreat to Canada, no barrier was left to the rise of the Jacksonian removalism that rested upon an exclusive dichotomy between civilization and barbarism.

6. The Paradox of Jacksonian Democracy: Removalism and the “Trail of Tears”

The victory of the Jacksonian doctrine in post-War of 1812 America meant that the sixty-year-long struggle of the Euroamerican people from 1750s to 1810s to control the Trans-Appalachian West (Nichols, 2008, 1) and to construct the *white* American Self finally ended. At last, peace came to eastern America, “peace as the concept was understood by (Euro-) Americans” (Gould, 2012, 208), and the age of populist imperialism flourished. A series of events, such as Jackson’s invasion of Florida (1818) that eradicated the remnants of the Spanish

Empire in the region, the Monroe Doctrine (1823) as an international “license” (Gould, 2012, 211) for continental expansion without any further European powers’ interference, the inauguration of President Jackson (1829) overwhelmingly supported by frontiersmen, Chief Justice John Marshall’s doctrine in *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* (1831) decreeing that “an Indian tribe or nation within the United States is not a foreign state” but a “domestic dependent nation,”²⁸ and, finally, the notorious “Trail of Tears” (1831) following the Indian Removal Act of 1830, all marked “the sundering of the final vestige of the eighteenth-century borderlands diplomatic regime” (Sadosky, 2009, 215).

In the dramatic case of the conflict between Georgia State and the Cherokee tribe, the previous “treaties” between the Cherokee nation and the US had virtually recognized the sovereignty of the native tribe as a foreign nation. In *Worcester v. Georgia* (1832), John Marshall defined the Cherokee nation as “a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force” (Quoted in Bender, 2006, 197). Moreover, the Cherokees had actively accepted the US government’s “civilization program,” such as private ownership, agriculture, the written constitution, and even the black slavery (Sadosky, 2009, 210-211; Bender, 2006, 193-195).

However, the guiding principle behind US “Indian” policy already shifted from the Jeffersonian “civilizing mission” to forced relocation or militaristic imperialism. To the supporters of the Jackson doctrine, the existing treaties were merely deceptive devices that could be readily revoked. Echoing the conventional Lockean justification of colonization as well as the Old Testament, Georgia Governor George Gilmer represented such a Jacksonian approach to the Indian affairs:

Treaties were expedients by which ignorant, intractable, and savage people were induced without bloodshed to yield up what civilized people had the right to possess by virtue of that command of the Creator delivered to man upon his formation-be fruitful, multiply, and replenish

²⁸ Although he excluded Amerindian nations from the sphere of international law, the fact that Marshall recognized “the privileges of self-rule and national integrity accorded tributary nations” was later used by Native Americans to protect their “tribal sovereignty” (Shoemaker, 2004, 102).

the earth, and subdue it (cited in Berkhofer, Jr., 1979, 161).

In his annual message to Congress on the Removal Act, President Jackson (1830) justified his brutal colonial policy by mobilizing the binary logic of civilized Self and barbarian Other:

What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand *savages* to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms embellished with all the improvements which art can devise or industry execute, occupied by more than 12,000,000 happy people, and filled with all the blessings of liberty, *civilization* and religion? (emphasis mine)

And, in his Farewell Address, Jackson proudly boasted of his “Indian removal” as his first achievement: “The states which had so long been retarded in their improvement by the Indian tribes residing in the midst of them are at length relieved from this evil” (cited in Morone, 2014, 23-24). Therefore, the United States in the age of Jackson gained full membership to the European inter-imperial society that dominated the extra-European world and its racialized Others (Bender, 2006, 191; Gould, 2012). A new set of colonialist norms unilaterally imposed by Jacksonian America replaced the older “middle ground” norms of accommodation.²⁹

One paradox in this ideological shift is that the democratization of American politics initiated in the Jacksonian age³⁰ promoted the Westward imperial expansion. Although it was Jacksonian America that Tocqueville visited and wrote his masterpiece *Democracy in America*, the period was also “high noon of the *white* republic” (Smith, 1997, 197). As the Euromerican mass in the frontier regions increasingly participated in election politics and voted for the Jacksonian agrarians to secure more free land, the old philanthropist Jeffersonians, who partly defended Native American rights and advocated a gradual and voluntary purchase of Amerindian

²⁹ Even Henry Clay, who led the opposition to Jackson's major policies by creating Whig Party, shared Jackson's racist attitude toward “Indians.” He believed that Amerindians “were destined to extinction” because they were “inferior to the Anglo-Saxon race which were now taking their place on this continent” (cited in Bender, 2006, 197).

³⁰ For a classic analysis of Andrew Jackson as the personification of frontier democracy, see Turner (1994 [1903], 85-87).

land, lost their voices in the political public sphere (Adelman and Aron, 1999, 828). From the perspective of contemporary politicians, protecting the natives was not politically advantageous at all. Offering land to white settlers “not only brought votes but was thought to ensure social stability through geographic expansion” (Bender, 2006, 197), which would be later formulated as “the safety valve theory” (Turner, 1994 [1896]). The previous hegemonic ideas of progress and assimilation, which stemmed from the European Enlightenment and were held by the East Coast intellectual ruling elites, were then “reshaped by the resistance and pressure of the frontier states and their inhabitants” (Horsman, 1981, 114).³¹

In other words, the advancement of Turnerian American democracy was at the expense of native peoples. Even Tocqueville, who celebrated the achievement of American democracy, could not but record this dark side of American liberal progress in a sentimental note:

One cannot imagine the frightful afflictions that accompanied these forced migrations. When the Indians leave their ancestral fields they are already exhausted and worn down... Behind them there is famine, before them war, everywhere misery... With my own eyes I have witnessed miseries [and] afflictions beyond my power to portray... The sight will never leave my memory (cited in Morone, 2014, 23).

Social force	Identity/Other	Interest	Foreign Policy
Frontier white populations	Civilizing State vs. Savage	Removal & colonization Regime change	Popular Imperialism (Jacksonian)

7. The Jacksonian Tradition in US Grand Strategy: the Genealogy of Popular Imperialism/Unilateral Militarism

The United States was, from the beginning, a “facing west” (Drinnon, 1997) empire,

³¹ Besides, the federal configuration of the American state apparatus played an important role in strengthening the voice of the Western frontier as well. Deudney (2007, 168-69) points out that the decentralized military apparatus guaranteed by the Second Amendment—which was designed to secure republican polity against the danger of tyranny—undermined the capacity of the federal government to contain colonial excursions of frontiersmen, “enabling an unregulated populist imperialism to flourish.” See also Hendrickson (2009, 150).

with its back turned against the European Old World and the East. Its continental expansion, which was glorified as “Manifest Destiny,” shaped a part of authentic American worldview. Bruce Cumings (2009, 39) argues that the dominance of “Atlanticism” or a liberal internationalist consensus among the Eastern foreign policy elites after 1941 made us forget the expansionist characteristics of American “continentalism” in the nineteenth century, which has been consciously mischaracterized as “isolationism” in a pejorative sense. However, isolationism of the interwar period was a novel reaction against direct interaction with European countries during and after the First World War, which is distinguished from the Continentalism or Pacificism. It is arguably a “form of exclusive continentalism” that shaped the imperialist tendency of America until Atlanticism emerged as a mainstream ideology of foreign policy. Before the Second World War, Atlanticism in New England was merely a “regional and a minority phenomenon” in the United States (Cumings, 2009, 38-40).

Similarly, according to Hilde Eliassen Restad (2012, 64-68), a new consensus among diplomatic historians today is that nineteenth-century American foreign policy was not “isolationist” at all. At the core of “old paradigm” of isolationism, one contradiction exists: it advances that the US both expanded dramatically and kept isolationist during the nineteenth century. Basically, the “old thesis of expansionism as isolationism” represents a “Eurocentric view of American foreign policy, a perspective that viewed US international relations as primarily faced toward the Atlantic Ocean”(Restad, 2012, 64). Rather, US foreign policy, based on the idea of American exceptionalism, was always expansionist from the beginning of the country. John Mearsheimer (2014, 238) also emphasizes that the nineteenth-century US was the most expansionist state in both North and South Americas that tried to establish itself as a regional hegemon. For example, “Henry Cabot Lodge put the point well”, Mearsheimer quotes, “when he noted that the United States had a ‘record of conquest, colonization and expansion unequalled by any people in the nineteenth century’.” In this sense, the conventional interpretation that the year of “1898” was an aberration of American peaceful isolationism is a myth. Actually, the Spanish-American War was “a continuation of America’s ‘westward expansion’” (Bender, 2006, 219).

Put differently, there exists a genealogy of racist/Orientalist dichotomy between barbarianism and civilization vis-à-vis non-White peoples, including Indians, Mexicans/Latin Americans, Filipinos, and Muslims, in some parts of the American foreign policy discourse (Hunt, 1987, Ch. 3). This imperialist mindset originated from a “mixture of a Scots Irish Calvinism and the Frontier experience” (Lieven, 2004, 99) and was crystalized in the Jackson Doctrine against the East Coast intellectual elites and their security imaginary. The Jacksonian tradition imagines the American Self “as a folk community bound together by deep cultural and ethnic ties” (Mead, 2001, 226), and that “a strong sense of White identity and violent hostility to other races, was long at its core” (Lieven, 2004, 96). Self-imposed overseas missions of the US have been justified following the Jacksonian logics of a civilizing mission, which was once mobilized to rationalize the removal of Native Americans in the nineteenth century. Although the US encountered a variety of Others all over the world, “the figurations with which they were inscribed were drawn from the well-established narratives of otherness in American experience” (Campbell, 1998, 135).

During the Cold War times, the rise of “modernization theory” as the ideational underpinning of US foreign economic policy toward the “Third World” echoed the imperialist tradition of “civilizing” force that shaped earlier American interactions with peoples of color. For instance, Michael Latham analyzes the ideology of the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy administration and concludes:

Proclaimed as a new, enlightened attempt to secure the advances that European colonialism had failed to provide, the alliance cast the role of the United States through an *imperial discourse* of its own. Presenting the United States as a transformative catalyst, it recycled an ideology that resonated with the *nation's previous Western expansion* and overseas empire building. On the *New Frontier*, just as on the old, Americans emphasized their own historical road to progress and the duty and power of the United States to define and promote movement along it. Where expansionists once claimed that Providence ordained a continental Manifest Destiny, policymakers now turned toward social science to articulate a global vision (Latham, 1998, 229, emphasis mine).

At present, we are witnessing the most polarized US partisan politics, regionally divided between the “red states” of the South and Mountain West and the “blue states” of the North-East

and Pacific Coast (Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2013). In this context, the Jacksonian tradition, a maverick school from other American liberal creeds, has been exuberant in the “embittered White South” or “the Bible Belt.” In this region, the “socioeconomic anxieties of the White middle classes and rural populations often have fused with ethnic and racial fears” (Lieven, 2004, 93) and the exclusivist vision of Christian fundamentalism recently surged (Connolly, 2008, 44-59).³² Especially, “the ‘southernization’ of the Republican Party” after the late 1970s has provided the Jacksonian tradition with a new importance in the American domestic politics and consequently in the US foreign policy in our times (Lieven, 2004, 105; Lind, 2003).

A particular combination of the Jacksonian populism and the post-9/11 & the post-economic crisis conditions has produced a twenty first-century version of American popular imperialism. The spiraling turbulences induced by the Bush Doctrine and the Tea Party expressed the power of this new synthesis. The so-called Bush Doctrine, declared in the *National Security Strategy* of 2002 (The White House, 2002), was, in effect, “a doctrine of progressive imperialism” (Smith, 2012, 358). The policy entrepreneurship by neoconservatives, while securitizing global terrorism and the “axis of evil” (Emmers, 2007, 121-123; Donnelly, 2013), seized the 9/11 as a chance to transform the character of world politics. They regarded the United States as a “civilizing force” against “barbarian” terrorists (Bowden, 2009, 177-185). The 9/11 was defined that “a group of *barbarians* have declared war on the American people” (Bush, 2001a, emphasis mine). President Bush also stated, “There is a great divide in our time-not between religions or cultures, but between *civilization* and *barbarism*” (Bush, 2001b, emphasis mine). Later, the demarcation line between civilization and barbarism was extended to the entire planet: “Any government that chooses to be an ally of terror has also chosen to be an *enemy of civilization*, and the *civilized world* will hold those regimes to account” (Bush, 2005, emphasis mine).

Even though the neoconservative moment and the Tea Party movement themselves may

³² On the history of distinctive “southern identity,” see Cobb (2000; 2005) and Ayers (1996).

disappear, the Jacksonian legacy, or the populist energy in US politics will persist (Mead, 2011, 34). Thus, the analysis of US grand strategy should always take impacts of this unorthodox tradition into consideration.

8. Conclusion

The present research engages with two International Relations theories: constructivism and the English School.

Constructivism

My paper opens a historical inquiry into the way in which the Hobbesian culture was constituted through early modern intercivilizational encounters, and how an imperial *hierarchy* rather than an international *anarchy* was established between Europe and the extra-European world. This study is a response to Wendt's (1992, 404) suggestion that a "systemic empirical study of first contacts would be interesting" to understand "how self-regarding ideas about security might develop" in world history. In his own account, the "First Encounter" between Europeans and Native Americans was unique in the sense that "their interaction was highly structured by their beliefs about each other, beliefs that were rooted in pre-Encounter experiences and thus not shared" (Wendt, 1999, 158). Likewise, I also place an emphasis on the importance of preconceptions of alterity as a main factor that structures the Self-Other relationship. I argue that the European intellectual heritage, such as Christianity and the Enlightenment, and the European binary attitude to various Others had a grave impact on the formation of Euro-American identity and interest in early modern North America.

The English School

While Barry Buzan (2014, 169) recently mentioned that "the Americas generally and the US in particular are still only weakly represented in how the expansion story is told," my research tries to participate in filling this regional gap in the English School. In particular, the present paper resonates with those revisionists who criticize the Eurocentrism that is inherent in the English School. Kayaoglu (2010), Keal (2003), Keene (2002; 2014), and Seth (2013) all

share the notion that the English School's problematic of the "expansion of international society" (Bull and Watson eds., 1984; Buzan and Little, 2010) inadequately presupposes the priority (and superiority) of the European interstate order and ignores the existence of a premodern intercivilizational relationship between Europe and Asia. The story of expansion is "incomplete" in describing the entirety of modern world politics because "the dispossession and destruction of indigenous societies" or "the dark side of the story of expansion" is invisible in the Eurocentric narrative of world history (Keal, 2003, 2). Thus, it should be noted that two profoundly disparate logics/spheres of international relations were established in the modern world: the "European order of toleration" predicated on the principles of sovereignty, i.e., equality and independence; and the "extra-European order" of inequality on the basis of the "hierarchical institutions through which colonial and imperial powers transmitted the supposed benefits of their civilization to the rest of the world" (Keene, 2002, xi). The new idea of "the standard of civilization" was the measure to divide these two spheres, the West and the "Rest," and defined the historical role of Europe or "the civilizing mission" in modern times.

As Michael Shapiro (1997, 209) emphasizes, we need to return to the early modern imperial encounters and reevaluate them in order to "unread the global histories and unmap the moral geographies that fix the violence of representation" in our era. Along these lines, my paper situates US history in the modern colonial division of the world and traces the formation of imperial/civilizing identity in the American Self through its own colonial project in the Western frontier.

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